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Abstract
How do people learn? We assess, in a distribution-free manner, subjects' learning
and choice rules in dynamic two-armed bandit learning experiment. To aid in identi-
cation and estimation, we use auxiliary measures of subjects' beliefs, in the form of
their eye-movements during the experiment. Our estimated choice probabilities and
learning rules have some distinctive features; notably, subjects are more reluctant to
"update down" following unsuccessful choices, than "update up" following successful
choices. The prots from following the estimated learning and decision rules are smaller
(by about 25% of typical experimental earnings) than what would be obtained from an
optimal Bayesian learning model, but comparable to the prots from alternative non-
Bayesian learning models, including reinforcement learning and a simple \win-stay"
choice heuristic.
Keywords: learning, experiments, eye-tracking, Bayesian vs. non-Bayesian learning,
nonparametric estimation
JEL codes: D83, C91, C14
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How do individuals learn from past experience in dynamic choice environments? We address
this question by presenting nonparametric estimates of subjects' learning rules in a dynamic
two-armed bandit experiment, where subjects must repeatedly guess which of the two arms
yields a (stochastically) higher reward. Auxiliary measures of subjects' eye movements as
they make their choices are employed to \pin down" subjects' beliefs in each round of the
learning experiment. The nonparametric estimation of learning models is a new endeavor
in both the experimental learning literature, as well as the empirical literature in economics
and marketing in which dynamic learning models are estimated structurally using eld data.
Estimating the learning rules in a model-free manner allows us to assess the optimality of
subjects' choices in learning experiments in a manner quite distinct from that taken in the
existing literature.
A sizable literature has developed around structural estimation of learning-based models
of dynamic choice. Some representative papers include R. Miller (1984), T. Erdem & M.
Keane (1996), D. Ackerberg (2003), G. Crawford & M. Shum (2005), T. Chan & B. Hamilton
(2006), and P. Marcoul & Q. Weninger (2008). This literature typically assumes that agents
process information according to a forward-looking Bayesian learning model. This restrictive
assumption is driven in part by data considerations: oftentimes, all that is observed are the
sequences of agents' choices, so that a lot of (parametric) structure must be placed on the
learning model for identication.
In controlled experimental settings, richer data are observed: not only subjects' choices, but
also the outcomes (rewards) from their choices. In addition, there is also the opportunity to
observe \auxiliary" measures of subjects' beliefs (or valuations), such as eye movements (as
in K. Armel & A. Rangel (2008), and the present paper), brain activity (cf. W. Yoshida &
S. Ishii (2006), E. Boorman, T. Behrens, M. Woolrich & M. Rushworth (2009) in the recent
fMRI neuroscience literature), or mouse-tracking (cf. I. Brocas, J. Carrillo, S. Wang & C.
Camerer (2009)).
Because of this additional data richness, researchers in the behavioral/experimental literature
have been able to consider more exible learning rules, and to test the fully-rational Bayesian
learning benchmark versus boundedly-rational, non-Bayesian alternatives. An incomplete3
list of papers which consider these questions includes D. Grether (1992), M. El-Gamal & D.
Grether (1995), G. Charness & D. Levin (2005), C. Kuhnen & B. Knutson (2008), and E.
Payzan-LeNestour & P. Bossaerts (2011). Recently, non-Bayesian reinforcement learning (R.
Sutton & A. Barto (1998)) models have also been used to explain some observed anomalies
in savings and investment behavior (eg. J. Choi, D. Laibson, B. Madrian & A. Metrick
(2009), T. Odean, M. Strahilevitz & B. Barber (2004)).1
In this paper, we take a new approach to assessing learning in experimental settings. Taking
advantage of recent developments in the econometrics of estimating dynamic models with
serially-correlated unobservables, we use the observed choice and eye-tracking data to esti-
mate, nonparametrically, subjects' choice probabilities and learning rules, without imposing
a priori functional forms on these functions. Thus, our learning rules can be reasonably
interpreted as \what the subjects actually think", as reected in their observed choices.
Moreover, we also estimate subjects' decision rules nonparametrically jointly from the ob-
served choice and eye movement data. To our knowledge, the present paper is the rst which
undertakes the nonparametric estimation of structural decision models using experimental
data.
Our main results are: (i) subjects' reduced-form decision rules resemble an asymmetric
"win-stay/lose-randomize" rule of thumb, whereby subjects replay successful strategies, but
randomize after unsuccessful ones; (ii) correspondingly, our estimates of the learning rules
show that subjects are more reluctant to "update down" following unsuccessful choices,
than "update up" following successful choices; such asymmetries are suboptimal relative
to the rational Bayesian benchmark, and (iii) we nd that that subjects' prots are, at the
median, $4 (or about two cents per choice) lower than under the Bayesian benchmark, which
represents about 25% of typical experimental earnings (not including the xed show-up fee).
However, subjects' prots under the estimated choice and learning rules are comparable to
the prots from alternative non-Bayesian learning models, including reinforcement learning.
1In the computational IO literature, such learning algorithms have also been used to ease the computa-
tional burden associated with dynamic equilibrium models, cf. A. Pakes & P. McGuire (2001), S. Imai, N.
Jain & A. Ching (2009).4
Our approach diers from a common modus operandi in the behavioral/experimental lit-
erature, which has been to use the observed choice data from the experiment to calibrate
parameters for competing learning models. Subsequently, the competing learning models
are simulated, and verication is based upon comparing the simulated learning rules with
the observed auxiliary belief measurements. For instance, A. Hampton, P. Bossaerts & J.
O'Doherty (2006) test between a Bayesian and reinforcement-learning model on the basis
of two-armed bandit experiments supplemented with brain activity information from fMRI
brainscans.2 Instead, our approach represents a novel application of econometric tools re-
cently developed for the estimation of nonclassical measurement error models and dynamic
discrete-choice models (Y. Hu (2008), Y. Hu & M. Shum (2008)). Essentially, we t the learn-
ing model into a dynamic misclassication framework, in which the eye-movement measures
play the role of \noisy measurements" of the underlying belief process. We obtain a sim-
ple estimator for the learning model which involves only elementary calculations involving
matrices which can be formed from the observed data.3
In the next section, we describe the dynamic two-armed bandit learning (probabilistic rever-
sal learning) experiment, and the eye movement data gathered by the eye-tracker machine.
In Section 2, we present an econometric model of subjects' choices in the bandit model, and
discuss nonparametric identication and estimation. In Section 3, we describe the experi-
mental data, and present our nonparametric estimates of subjects decision rules and learning
rules. Section 4 contains a comparison of our estimated learning rules to \standard" learning
rules, including those from the Bayesian and non-Bayesian reinforcement-learning models.
Section 5 concludes.
2Other papers utilizing a similar methodological framework include T. Behrens, M. Woolrich, M. Walton
& M. Rushworth (2007), Boorman et al. (2009), N. Daw, J. O'Doherty, P. Dayan, B. Seymour & R. Dolan
(2006), Yoshida & Ishii (2006).
3More broadly, because subjects' underlying beliefs are unobserved and also serially correlated over time,
learning models are a particular case of nonlinear \hidden state Markov" models, which are typically quite
challenging to estimate (cf. Z. Ghahramani (2001) and P. Arcidiacono & R. Miller (2006)). Relatedly, K.
Samejima, K. Doya, Y. Ueda & M. Kimura (2004) consider Bayesian estimation of a reinforcement learning
model using sequential Monte Carlo (\particle ltering") methods.5
1 Two-armed bandit \reversal learning" experiment
Our experiments are adapted from the "reversal learning" experiment used in Hampton,
Bossaerts & O'Doherty (2006). In the experiments, subjects make repeated choices between
two actions (which we call interchangeably \arms" or \slot machines" in what follows): in
trial t, the subject chooses Yt 2 f1(= \green");2(= \blue")g. The rewards generated by
these two arms are changing across trials, as described by the state variable St 2 f1;2g,
which is never observed by subjects. When St = 1, then green (blue) is the \good" (\bad")
state, whereas if St = 2, then blue (green) is the \good" (\bad") state.
The rewards Rt that the subject receives in trial t depends on the action taken, as well as
(stochastically) on the current state: the reward process is
Rt =
8
<
:
$0:50 with prob. 50% 20% if good arm chosen
$0:50 with prob. 50% 10% if bad arm chosen.
(1)
For convenience, we use the notation Rt = 1 to denote the negative reward (-$0.50), and
Rt = 2 to denote the positive reward ($0.50).
The state evolves according to an exogenous binary Markov process. At the beginning of
each block, the initial state S1 2 f1;2g is chosen with probability 0.5, randomly across all
subjects and all blocks. Subsequently, the state evolves with transition probabilities4
P(St+1jSt) St = 1 St = 2
St+1 = 1 0.85 0.15
St+1 = 2 0.15 0.85
. (2)
Because St is not observed by subjects, and is serially-correlated over time, subject have an
opportunity to learn and update their beliefs about the current state on the basis of past
4This aspect of our model diers from Hampton, Bossaerts & O'Doherty (2006), who make the non-
Markovian assumption that the state St changes with probability 25% after a subject has chosen the good
arm four successive times. Estimating such non-Markovian models would, typically, require including another
state variable, which describe how uncertain the subject is at any point in time about the underlying state
(such as the variance of rewards). In principle, our estimation method can be extended to allow for these
additional state variables, but since we take a nonparametric approach, a much larger sample size (far beyond
typical samples sizes in experimental work) would be required to obtain reasonable estimates.6
rewards. Moreover, because St changes randomly over time, so that the identity of the good
arm varies across trials, this is called a \probabilistic reversal learning" experiment.
1.1 Optimal decision-making in reversal learning model
Before proceeding to describe the experimental data, we consider how subjects should opti-
mally make decisions in the dynamic reversal-learning model used in our experiments. The
qualitative features of the optimal decision and belief updating rules presented here will
motivate the assumptions which underlie the empirical learning model which we estimate in
this paper. As in the experiments, we consider a nite (25 period) dynamic optimization
problem, in which each subject aims to choose a sequence of actions to maximize expected
rewards E
P25
t=1 Rt

: (The details of this model are given in Appendix A.)
Let B
t denote the probability (given by Bayes' Rule) denote the probability that a subject
places on \green" being the good arm in period t, conditional on the whole experimental
history up to then. We evaluate the optimal decision rules { the mapping from period t beliefs
B
t to a period t choice { in this dynamic Bayesian learning model by computer simulation.
Importantly, we accommodate nonstationarity in the problem, in that our simulations allow
the decision rules to dier arbitrarily across periods. This permits the relationship between
subjects' choices and their beliefs B
t to vary across periods, depending perhaps on the
periods remaining in the experiment, or to allow for history dependence in either choices or
the belief-updating rule. An important maintained assumption in this paper is that subjects'
decision rules are solely a function of the current state probabilities B
t, so that by allowing
the decision rules to vary across periods in these simulations, we can assess the restrictiveness
of such an assumption.
The important qualitative features of optimal decision-making are summarized in the optimal
decision-rules, which we plot in Figure 2 for four periods t = 1;10;20;25. Two features are
apparent. First, we see that the decision rules are identical across all the periods, indicating
that they are stationary. Second, the optimal decision rule takes a simple form: in each
period, the subject chooses simply blue once the current belief that the blue arm is \good"7
Figure 1: Timeline of a trial
After a xation on the cross (top screen), two slot machines are presented (second screen).
Subjects' eye-movements are recorded by the eye-tracking machine here. Subjects choose by
pressing the left (right) arrow key to indicate a choice of the left (right) slot machine. After
choosing (third screen), a positive reward (depicted by two quarters) or negative reward (two
quarters covered by a red X) is delivered, along with feedback about the subject's choice
highlighted against a background color corresponding to the choice. In the bottom screen, a
subject is transitioned to the next trial, and reminded that a slot machine may switch from
\good" to \bad" (and vice versa) with probability 15%.8
Figure 2: Optimal decision rules in reversal learning model
Plotted for periods t = 1;10;20;25.
x-axis: Bayesian belief B
t ; y-axis: Action choice.9
exceeds 50%. This is a myopic decision rule.
Both of these features { stationarity and myopia of decision rules { are specic to the reversal-
learning setup considered here, and diers in important ways from optimal decision-making in
the standard multi-armed bandit (MAB) problem (cf. J. Gittins & G. Jones (1974), J. Banks
& R. Sundarum (1992)), in which the states of the bandits are xed over all periods and the
bandits are \independent" in that a reward from one bandit is uninformative about the state
of another bandit. The optimal Bayesian decision rule in the standard MAB model features
exploration (or \experimentation"), which recommends sacricing current rewards to achieve
longer-term payos; this makes simple myopic decision-making (choosing the bandit which
currently has the higher expected reward) suboptimal. In the reversal learning setting,
however, the states of the bandits are negatively related, so that positive information about
one slot machine implies negative information about the other. Apparently, as shown by these
optimal decision rules, this eliminates most of the incentives for subjects to experiment.
Moreover, in a nite-horizon decision environment, such as the experiments considered here,
the value of information decreases exogenously as the nal period approaches, resulting in
reduced incentives for experimentation; this implies a nonstationary decision rule. Under
reversal learning, however, the lack of experimentation leads to stationary decision rules,
even in a nite horizon problem.
1.2 Experimental data: preliminary analysis
The experiments were run over several weeks in November-December 2009. We used 21
subjects, recruited from the Caltech Social Science Experimental Laboratory (SSEL) subject
pool consisting of undergraduate/graduate students, post-doctoral students, and community
members,5 each playing for 200 rounds (broken up into 8 blocks of 25 trials). Most of the
subjects completed the experiment within 40 minutes, including instruction and practice
5Community members consisted of spouses of students at either Caltech or Pasadena City College (a
two-year junior college). While the results reported below were obtained by pooling the data across all
subjects, we also estimated the model separately for the subsamples of Caltech students, vs. community
members. There were few noticeable dierences in the results across these classes of subjects.10
sessions. Subjects were paid a xed show-up fee ($20), in addition to the amount won
during the experiment, which was $14.20 on average.6
Subjects were informed of the reward structure for good and bad slot machines, and the
Markov transition probabilities for state transitions (reversals), but were not informed which
state was occurring in each trial. In Figure 1, we present the time line and some screen-
shots from the experiment. In addition, while performing the experiment, the subjects were
attached to an eye-tracker machine, which recorded their eye movements. From this, we
constructed the auxiliary variable ~ Zt, which measures the fraction of the reaction time (the
time between the onset of a new round after xation, and the subject's choice in that round)
spent gazing at the picture of the \blue" slot machine on the computer screen.7
For each subject, and each round t, we observe the data (Yt;St;Rt;Zt). Table 1 presents some
summary statistics of the data. The top panel shows that, across all subjects and all trials,
\green" (2108 choices) and \blue" (2092 choices) are chosen in almost-equal proportions.
Moreover, from the second panel, we see that subjects obtain the high reward with frequency
of roughly 57% ( 2398=(2398 + 1802)). This is slightly higher than, but signicantly
dierent from, 55%, which is the frequency which would obtain if the subjects were choosing
completely randomly.8 Hence, subjects appear to be \trying", which motivates our analysis
of their learning rules. On the other hand, simulation of the optimal Bayesian decision rules
(discussed above) show that the success rate from using the optimal decision rule is only
58.4%, which is just slightly higher than the in-sample success rate found in the experiments.
It appears, then, that in the reversal learning setting, the success rate intrinsically varies
quite narrowly between 55% and 58.4%.
In Table 2, we present the conditional probabilities of choices in period t, conditional on
choices and rewards from the previous period (YtjYt 1;Rt 1). This can be interpreted as
6For comparison, purely random choices would have earned $10 on average.
7Across trials, the location of the \blue" and \green" slot machines were randomized, so that the same
color is not always located on the same side of the computer screen. This controls for any \right side bias"
which may be present (see discussion further below).
8This is the marginal probability of a good reward, which equals 0:5(0:7+0:4) from Eq. (1). The t-statistic
for the null that subjects are choosing randomly equals 169.67, so that hypothesis is strongly rejected.11
Table 1: Summary statistics for experimental data
1(green) 2(blue)
Y : subjects' choices 2108 2092
1 ($0.50) 2 (-$0.50)
R: rewards 2398 1802
mean median upper 5% lower 5%
~ Z: eye movement measurea -0.0309 0 1.3987 -1.4091
RT: reaction time (10 2 secs) 88.22 59.3 212.2 36.8
aDened in Eq. (3)
a \reduced-form" decision rule for the subjects. The top row in that table contains the
reduced-form probabilities of choosing the green arm. Looking at the second (fourth) entry
in this row, we see that after a successful choice of green (blue), a subject replays this strategy
with probability 0.86 (0.88=1-0.12). Thus subjects appear to replay successful strategies,
corresponding to a \win-stay" rule-of-thumb.
However subjects appear reluctant to give up unsuccessful strategies. The probability of
replaying a strategy after an unsuccessful choice of the same strategy is around 50% for both
the blue and green choices (ie. the rst and third entries in this row). Thus, subjects tend
to randomize after unsuccessful strategies. As far as we are aware, such an \asymmetric"
choice rule is new in the literature; moreover, as we will see below, this is echoed in the
\asymmetric" belief-updating rule which we estimate.
In the remainder of Table 2, we also present the same choice probabilities, calculated for
each subject individually. There is some degree of heterogeneity in subjects' strategies.
Looking at columns 2 and 4 or the table, we see that, for the most part, subjects pursue
a \win-stay" strategy: the probabilities in the second column are mainly >> 50%, and
those in the fourth column are most << 50%. However, looking at columns 1 and 3, we
see that there is signicant heterogeneity in subjects' choices following a low reward. In12
these cases, randomization (which we classify as a choice probability between 40-60%) is the
modal strategy among subjects; strikingly, however, a number of subjects continue replaying
an unsuccessful strategy: for examples, subjects 3,8, and 11 continue to choose \green" with
probabilities of 79%, 89% and 79% even after a previous choice of green yielded a negative
reward.9
One common feature of the choice strategies across all subjects is that choices are serially
correlated across periods, conditional on rewards. This serial correlation is very informative
for identifying the beliefs X
t . Essentially, we present a model below in which serial correla-
tion in choices across periods arises due to beliefs | thus, beliefs (which are unobserved to
the researcher) are the reason for serial correlation of choices. We will discuss this in more
detail in the next section, in which the empirical model is presented formally.
1.3 Remarks on eye-tracking measure
Eye-tracking is still a relatively novel tool in economics; recently, it has been employed
to assess subjects thinking processes in various decision environments: to determine how
subjects detect truth-telling or deception in sender-receiver games (J.T. Wang, M. Spezio &
C.F. Camerer (2010)); how consumers evaluate comparatively a huge number of commodities,
as in a supermarket setting (E. Reutskaja, R. Nagel, C.F. Camerer & A. Rangel (2011));
and the relationship between visual attention (as measured by eye-xations) and valuation
of commodities in choice tasks (cf. I. Krajbich, C. Armel & A. Rangel (2010), Armel &
Rangel (2008), K. Armel, A. Beaumel & A. Rangel (2008), A. Rangel (2008)).10
Our use of eye movements in this paper is predicated on an assumption that gaze is related
to beliefs of expected rewards. This is motivated by some recent results in behavioral neuro-
science. S. Shimojo, C. Simion, E. Shimojo & C. Scheier (2003) studied this in binary \face
9In the reversal learning model, however, such a strategy is not obviously irrational; because the identity
of the good arm changes exogenously across periods, an arm that was bad last period (ie. yielding a low
reward) may indeed be good in the next period.
10Eye-tracking has also been used in marketing studies to evaluate the relationship between visual attention
to advertisements and subsequent sales of advertised items (eg. J. Zhang, M. Wedel & R. Pieters (2009)).13
Table 2: \Reduced-form" decision rule: P(Yt = 1(green)jYt 1;Rt 1)
(Yt 1;Rt 1): (1,1) (1,2) (2,1) (2,2)
All Subjects: 0.5075 0.8652 0.5089 0.1189
(0:0169) (0:0094) (0:1169) (0:0090)
Subject1: 0.1799 0.5192 0.8128 0.364
(0:0655) (0:0684) (0:0595) (0:0603)
Subject2: 0.1051 0.9820 0.9449 0
(0:0498) (0:0171) (0:0381) (0)
Subject3: 0.7938 0.9859 0.3340 0
(0:0591) (0:0136) (0:0871) (0)
Subject4: 0.3244 0.8796 0.6492 0.0610
(0:0704) (0:0514) (0:0726) (0:0283)
Subject5: 0.0419 0.8796 0.6492 0.0610
(0:0292) (0:0236) (0:0325) (0:0461)
Subject6: 0.2570 0.7498 0.8159 0.2021
(0:0652) (0:0592) (0:0602) (0:0532)
Subject7: 0.5792 0.9242 0.4647 0.0796
(0:0751) (0:0371) (0:0731) (0:0379)
Subject8: 0.8931 0.9803 0.1013 0.0165
(0:0496) (0:0186) (0:0482) (0:0163)
Subject9: 0.6377 1.0000 0.2741 0
(0:0831) (0) (0:0655) (0)
Subject10: 0.1986 0.9344 0.8037 0
(0:0622) (0:0352) (0:0587) (0)
Subject11: 0.7859 1.0000 0.4306 0
(0:0575) (0) (0:0870) (0)
Subject12: 0.5883 0.9262 0.3741 0.0131
(0:0841) (0:0406) (0:0733) (0:0129)
Subject13: 0.6741 0.8907 0.1962 0.2085
(0:0705) (0:0462) (0:0581) (0:0539)
Subject14: 0.4730 0.6147 0.5363 0.3842
(0:0831) (0:0653) (0:0735) (0:0664)
Subject15: 0.6759 0.9789 0.3351 0
(0:0761) (0:0206) (0:0714) (0)
Subject16: 0.4595 0.9135 0.5443 0.1953
(0:0715) (0:0316) (0:0742) (0:0666)
Subject17: 0.6358 0.5202 0.5322 0.4644
(0:0660) (0:0706) (0:0780) (0:0748)
Subject18: 0.6333 1.0000 0.2901 0
(0:0834) (0) (0:0734) (0)
Subject19: 0.6144 0.8197 0.5808 0.2013
(0:0702) (0:0444) (0:0806) (0:0625)
Subject20: 0.3699 0.5741 0.3699 0.3554
(0:0858) (0:0707) (0:0665) (0:0621)
Subject21: 0.6990 0.9602 0.2934 0.0177
(0:0658) (0:0274) (0:0693) (0:0171)
Note: standard errors (in parentheses) computed using 1000 bootstrap resamples14
choice" tasks, in which subjects are asked to choose one of the two presented faces on the
basis of various criteria. (Our two-armed bandit task is very similar in construction.) These
authors nd that, when subjects are asked to choose a face based on attractiveness, their eye
movements are directed to the preferred face and remained there longer. Interestingly, the
relationship between gaze duration and the chosen face becomes signicantly weaker when
subjects are asked to choose a face based on shape and \unattractiveness". This strongly
suggests that directed gaze duration reects preferences, rather than choices.
This work echoes primate experiments reported in J. Lauwereyns, K. Watanabe, B. Coe &
O. Hikosaka (2002) and R. Kawagoe, Y. Takikawa & O. Hikosaka (1998) (see the survey in
O. Hikosaka, K. Nakamura & H. Nakahara (2006)), which shows that primates tend to direct
their gaze at locations where rewards are available. They also establish a physiological basis
for this relationship, by showing a connection between eye movements and reward-sensitive
neuronal activities in the basal ganglia part of the brain. These results, which link gaze
direction and duration with expected rewards, provide some precedence and justication to
our use of eye movements as \noisy measures" of beliefs, which likewise reect perceptions
of expected rewards from the slot machines.11
Based on the papers above, we dene ~ Zit, our raw eye-movement measure, as the dierence
in the gaze duration directed at the blue and green slot machines, normalized by the total
reaction time:
~ Zt = (Zb;t   Zg;t)=RTt; (3)
that is, for trial t, Zb(g);t is the xation duration at the blue (green) slot machine, and RTt is
the reaction time, ie. the time between the onset of the trial after xation, and the subject's
choice.12 Thus, ~ Zt measures how much longer a subject looks at the blue slot machine than
11An alternative to using eye movements to proxy for beliefs would have been to elicit beliefs (as in Y.
Nyarko & A. Schotter (2002)). However, given the length of our experiments (8 trials of 25 periods each), and
our need to have beliefs for each period, it seemed infeasible to elicit beliefs. Indeed, in our pilot experiments,
we tried eliciting beliefs randomly after some periods, and found that this made the experiments unduly
long.
12Furthermore, in order to control for subject-specic heterogeneity, we normalize ~ Zt across subjects by
dividing by the subject-specic standard deviation of ~ Zt, across all rounds for each subject.15
the green one during the t-th trial, with a larger (smaller) value of ~ Zt implying longer xation
time at the blue (green) slot machine. Summary statistics on this measure are given in the
bottom panel of Table 1. There, we see that the average reaction time is 0.88 seconds, and
that the median value of ~ Zt is zero, implying an equal amount of time directed to each of
the two slot machine.13
Figure 5 in the Appendix contains the scatter plot of Zb;t versus Zg;t. In our empirical work,
we will discretize the eye-movement measure ~ Zt; to avoid confusion, in the following we use
~ Zt to denote the undiscretized eye-movement measure, and Zt the discretized measure, which
we describe below.
2 Empirical Model
In this section, we describe our econometric model of dynamic decision-making in the two-
armed bandit experiment described above, and also discuss the identication and estimation
of this model. Importantly, most of the crucial assumptions of the model are motivated by
the structure of the optimal decision rules and learning (belief updating) rules, as described
in Section 1.1. That is, we do not consider the whole gamut of learning models here, but
restrict attention to models which are \close" to optimal in that the structure of the learning
and decision rules are the same as in the optimal model; however, the rules themselves are
allowed to be dierent.
13Following the suggestions of a referee, we also considered an alternative denition of the eye movement
measure ~ Zt = (Zb;t   Zg;t)=(Zb;t + Zg;t), in which the time spent gazing at the middle of the screen (which
is RTt   Zb;t   Zg;t) is not included in the denominator. This allows for the possibility that the time spent
gazing in the middle may be indicative of \contemplation", and may lead to stronger subsequent beliefs.
We found that the estimation results for the choice probabilities and learning rules from this alternative
specication (which are available from the authors upon request) are quite similar to the results from our
standard specication, which are reported below. This suggests that the time spent gazing in the middle of
the screen is not that informative about the evolution of subjects' beliefs. Similarly, another referee suggested
that the absolute reaction time RTt itself could be included in the denition of eye movements. However,
we found that the absolute value of ~ Zt is inversely related to RTt; this suggests that our measure ~ Zt appears
to capture or contain the information in reaction time.16
We introduce the variable X
t , which denotes the agent's round t beliefs about the cur-
rent state St; obviously, agents know their beliefs X
t , but these are unobserved by the
researcher.14 In what follows, we assume that both X and Z are discrete, and take support
on K distinct values which, without loss of generality, we denote f1;2;:::;Kg. We make
the following assumptions regarding the subjects' learning and decision rules:
Assumption 1 Subjects' choice probabilities P(YtjX
t ) only depend on current beliefs. More-
over, the choice probabilities P(Yt = yjX
t ) varies across dierent values of X
t (ie. beliefs
aect actions).
Because we interpret the unobserved variables X
t here as a measurement of subjects' current
beliefs regarding which arm is currently the \good" one, the choice probability P(YtjX
t ) can
be interpreted as that which arises from a \myopic" choice rule. As we remarked before, in
Section 1.1, such an interpretation is justied by the simulation of the optial choice rules
under the reversal learning setting, which showed that these rules are myopic and depend
only on current beliefs.
Furthermore, Assumption 1 embodies an important exclusion restriction that, conditional
on beliefs X
t , the observed action Yt is independent of the eye movement Zt. As we will
see below, this is a critical identication assumption which pins down the beliefs X
t in the
empirical model.
Assumption 2 The law of motion for X
t , which describes how subjects' beliefs change over
time given the past actions and rewards, is called the learning rule. This is a controlled
rst-order Markov process, with transition probabilities P(X
t jX
t 1;Rt 1;Yt 1).
This assumption is motivated by the structure of the optimal Bayesian belief-updating rule
(cf. Eq. (10) in Appendix A), in which the period t beliefs depend only on the past beliefs,
14X
t corresponds to the prior beliefs pt from the previous section except that, further below, we will
discretize X
t and assume that it is integer-valued. Therefore, to prevent any confusion, we will use distinct
notation pt, X
t to denote, respectively, the beliefs in the theoretical vs. the empirical model.17
actions, and rewards in period t   1. However, we allow the exact form of the learning rule
to deviate from the exact Bayes formula.
Assumption 3 The eye movement measure Zt is a noisy measure of beliefs X
t :
(i) Eye movements are serially uncorrelated conditional on beliefs: P(ZtjX
t ;Yt;Zt 1) =
P(ZtjX
t ).
(ii) For all t, the K K matrix GZtjZt 1, with (i;j) th entry equal to Pr(Zt = ijZt 1 = j),
is invertible.
(iii) E[ZtjX
t ] is increasing in X
t :
As with Assumption 1, this assumption involves an important exclusion restriction that,
conditional on X
t , the eye movement Zt in period t is independent of Zt 1. This serial
independence assumption is, to some extent, imposed by construction in the experimental
setup, because we require subjects to \x" their gaze in the middle of the computer screen
at the beginning of each period. This should remove any inherent serial correlation in eye
movements which is not related to the learning task.15
The invertibility assumption 3(i) is made on the observed matrix GZtjZt 1 with elements equal
to the conditional distribution of ZtjZt 1; hence it is testable. Assumption 3(ii) \normalizes"
the beliefs X
t in the sense that, because large values of Zt imply that the subject gazed longer
at blue, the monotonicity assumption implies that larger values of X
t denote more \positive"
beliefs that the current state is blue.
Assumption 4 The choice probabilities P(YtjX
t ), learning rules P(X
t jX
t 1;Rt 1;Yt 1),
and measurement probabilities P(ZtjX
t ) are the same for all subjects and trials t.
This \stationarity" assumption justies pooling the data across all subjects and trials for
estimating the model. As with the other assumptions, it is motivated by the structure of
15At the same time, we have also estimated models in which we allow Zt and Zt 1 to be correlated, even
conditional on X
t . These are reported in Appendix D. The results there show that the results are quite
similar, for dierent values of Zt 1, which imply that Assumption 3 is quite reasonable.18
optimal decision-making discussed in Section 1.1 above, where both the Bayesian belief-
updating rule (Eq. (10) in Appendix A) and optimal choice rules in Figure 2 are indeed
stationary.
2.1 Identication
In this section, we will use the shorthand notation f() to denote generically a probability
distribution. For identication, we exploit the following relationship: conditional on (Rt 1),
we have
f(Yt;Zt;X

t jY<t;Z<t;R<t;X

<t) = f(Yt;Zt;X

t jYt 1;Rt 1;X

t 1): (4)
Abusing terminology somewhat, we call this a \rst-order Markov" property, because the
model exhibits only a one-period history dependence:
f(Yt;Zt;X

t jY<t;Z<t;R<t;X

<t)
=f(YtjZt;X

t ;Y<t;Z<t;R<t;X

<t)  f(ZtjX

t ;Y<t;Z<t;R<t;X

<t)  f(X

t jY<t;Z<t;R<t;X

<t)
=f(YtjX

t )  f(ZtjX

t )  f(X

t jX

t 1;Rt 1;Yt 1)
=f(Yt;Zt;X

t jYt 1;Rt 1;X

t 1):
In the above, the second equality applies Assumptions 1, 2, and 3.
The unknown functions we want to identify and estimate are:
(i) f(YtjX
t ), the choice probabilities;
(ii) the learning rule f(X
t jX
t 1;Yt 1;Rt 1); and
(iii) the measurement probabilities f(ZtjX
t ), the mapping between the auxiliary measure Zt
and the unobserved beliefs X
t .
The nonparametric identication of these elements follows from an application of results
from Hu (2008), and follows two main steps. Before presenting it, we note that, despite
its simplicity, this model is not straightforward to estimate: given data on subjects' choices
and rewards, we need to estimate choice probabilities conditional on subjects' beliefs, even
though these beliefs are not only unobserved, but also changing over time.19
Step one: identication of choice probabilities P(YtjX
t) and measurement prob-
abilities P(ZtjX
t). Consider the joint density f(Zt;YtjZt 1), which is solely a function of
variables observed in the data. We can factor this density as follows:
f(Zt;YtjZt 1) =
X
X
t
f(Zt;Yt;X

t jZt 1)
=
X
X
t
f(ZtjYt;X

t ;Zt 1)f(Yt;X

t jZt 1)
=
X
X
t
f(ZtjYt;X

t ;Zt 1)f(YtjX

t ;Zt 1)f(X

t jZt 1)
=
X
X
t
f(ZtjX

t )f(YtjX

t )f(X

t jZt 1)
where the last equality applies assumptions 1 and 3.
For any xed Yt = y, then, we can write the above in matrix notation as:
Ay;ZtjZt 1 = BZtjX
t DyjX
t CX
t jZt 1
where A, B, C are all K  K matrices, and D is a K  K diagonal matrix. These are
dened as:
Ay;ZtjZt 1 =

fYt;ZtjZt 1(y;ijj)

i;j
BZtjX
t =

fZtjX
t (ijk)

i;k
CX
t jZt 1 =

fX
t jZt 1(kjj)

k;j
DyjX
t =
2
6 6 6 6
6 6
4
fYtjX
t (yj1) 0 0
0 fYtjX
t (yj2) 0
0 ... 0
0 0 fYtjX
t (yjK)
3
7 7 7 7
7 7
5
(5)
Similarly to the above, we can derive that
GZtjZt 1 = BZtjX
t CX
t jZt 1
where G is likewise a K  K matrix, dened as
GZtjZt 1 =

fZtjZt 1(ijj)

i;j : (6)20
From Assumption 3(i), we combine the two previous matrix equalities to obtain
Ay;ZtjZt 1G
 1
ZtjZt 1 = BZtjX
t DyjX
t B
 1
ZtjX
t : (7)
This is an eigenvalue decomposition of the matrix Ay;ZtjZt 1G
 1
ZtjZt 1, which can be computed
from the observed data sequence fYt;Ztg.16 This shows that from the observed data, we
can identify the matrices BZtjX
t and DyjX
t , which are the matrices with entries equal to
(respectively) the measurement probabilities P(ZtjX
t ) and choice probabilities P(YtjX
t ).
In order for this identication argument to be valid, the eigendecomposition in Eq. (7) must
be unique. This requires the eigenvalues in this decomposition (corresponding to choice
probabilities P(yjX
t )) to be distinctive; that is, P(yjX
t ) should vary in X
t . This is ensured
by Assumption 1. Furthermore, even if the eigendecomposition is unique, the representation
in Eq. (7) is invariant to the ordering (or permutation) and scalar normalization of eigen-
vectors. Assumption 3(ii) imposes the correct ordering on the eigenvectors: specically, it
implies that columns with higher average value correspond to larger value of X
t . Finally,
because the eigenvectors in the decomposition correspond to the conditional probabilities
P(ZtjX
t ), it is appropriate to normalize each column so that it sums to one. Hence, the
uniqueness of the eigendecomposition, coupled with the ordering and normalization assump-
tions, ensure that the choice probabilities, measurement probabilities, and learning rules can
be uniquely identied from the observed matrices A and G.
Step two: identication of learning rule probabilities P(X
t+1jX
t;Rt;Yt). Again,
start with a factorization
f(Zt+1;Yt;Rt;Zt) =
X
X
t
X
X
t+1
f(Zt+1;X

t+1;Yt;X

t ;Rt;Zt)
=
X
X
t
X
X
t+1
f(Zt+1jX

t+1)f(X

t+1jYt;X

t ;Rt)f(ZtjX

t )f (Yt;X

t ;Rt)
=
X
X
t
X
X
t+1
f(Zt+1jX

t+1)f(X

t+1;Yt;X

t ;Rt)f(ZtjX

t )
16Note that, from Eq. (6), the invertibility of G (which is Assumption 3(i)) implies the invertibility of B.21
where the second equality applies assumptions 1, 2, and 3. Then, for any xed Yt = y and
Rt = r, we have the matrix equality
HZt+1;y;r;Zt = BZt+1jX
t+1LX
t+1;X
t ;y;rB
0
ZtjX
t :
The matrices H and L are K  K matrices dened as
HZt+1;y;r;Zt =

fZt+1;Yt;Rt;Zt(i;y;r;j)

i;j
LX
t+1;X
t ;y;r =
h
fX
t+1;X
t ;Yt;Rt(i;j;y;r)
i
i;j
:
(8)
Assumption 4 ensures that BZt+1jX
t+1 = BZtjX
t . Hence, we can obtain LX
t+1;X
t ;y;r (corre-
sponding to the learning rule probabilities) directly from
LX
t+1;X
t ;y;r = B
 1
Zt+1jX
t+1HZt+1;y;r;Zt[B
0
ZtjX
t ]
 1: (9)
This result implies that two periods of data (Zt;Yt;Rt);(Zt 1;Yt 1;Rt 1) are sucient to
identify and estimate this learning model.
3 Estimation
Our estimation procedure mimics the two-step identication argument from the previous
section. That is, for xed values of (y;r), we rst form the matrices A, G, and H (as dened
previously) from the observed data, using sample frequencies to estimate the corresponding
probabilities. Then we obtain the matrices B, D, and L using the matrix manipulations in
Eqs. (7) and (9).
To implement this, we assume that the eye movement measures Zt and the unobserved
beliefs X
t are discrete, and take three values.17 One technical feature is that, because all the
elements in the matrices of interest B, D, and L correspond to probabilities, they must take
values within the unit interval. However, in the actual estimation, we found that occasionally
17Since the eye-movement measure ~ Zt is continuous, we must discretize it for estimation. We leave the
details of our discretization procedure (including a discussion of whether three points of discretization is
appropriate) in Appendix B.22
the estimates do go outside this range. In these cases, we obtained the estimates by a least-
squares tting procedure, where we minimized the elementwise sum-of-squares corresponding
to Eqs. (7) and (9), and explicitly restricted each element of the matrices to lie 2 [0;1]. This
was not a frequent recourse; only a handful of the estimates reported below needed to be
restricted in this manner.18
In addition, while the identication argument above was \cross-sectional" in nature, being
based upon two observations of fYt;Zt;Rtg per subject, in the estimation we exploited
the long time series data we have for each subject, and pooled every two time-contiguous
observations fYi;r;;Zi;r;;Ri;r;g
=t
=t 1 across all subjects i, all blocks r, and all trials  =
2;:::;25. Formally, this is justied under the assumption that the process fYt;Zt;Rtg is
stationary and ergodic for each subject and each block; under these assumptions, the ergodic
theorem ensures that the (across time and subjects) sample frequencies used to construct
the matrices A, G, and H converge towards population counterparts.19
3.1 Estimation results
Tables 3 and 4 present estimation results. Both X
t and Zt are discretized to take values
f1;2;3g. We interpret X = 1;3 as indicative of \strong beliefs" favoring (respectively) green
and blue, while the intermediate value X = 2 indicates that the subject is \not sure".20
18In principle, because we don't impose a priori that the estimated probabilities must lie in [0,1] in esti-
mated, we could use these overidentifying restrictions to test the model. While this works as an informal
\eyeball" test, developing the formal sampling theory behind such a test seems dicult, due to the complex-
ities in characterizing the behavior of a test statistic at the boundary values of 0 and 1, and so we do not
pursue it here.
19Results from Monte Carlo simulations (available from the authors on request) show that the estimation
procedure produces accurate estimates of the model components, with the dierences between the estimated
and actual values usually on the order of magnitude of 10 1 times the parameter value.
20We have tried to re-estimate the model allowing for more belief states ( 4), but the results we obtained
was not encouraging. This is due to our relatively small sample size; since our estimation approach is
nonparametric, it is dicult to obtain reliable estimates with modest sample sizes. At the same time, as we
pointed out above, statistical evidence indicates that it is sucient to discretize the eye movement measure
Zt into three values, which implies that beliefs X
t should not take more than 3 values.23
Table 3 contains the estimates of the choice and measurement probabilities.21 The rst and
last columns of the panels in this table indicate that choices and eyes movements are closely
aligned with beliefs, when beliefs are suciently strong (ie. are equal to either X = 1 or
X = 3). Specically, in these results, the probability of choosing a color contrary to beliefs
{ which is called the \exploration probability" in the literature { is small, being equal to
1.3% when X
t = 1, and only 0.64% when X
t = 3.
When X
t = 2, however, suggesting that the subject is unsure of the state, there is a slight
bias in choices towards \blue", with Yt = 2 roughly 56% of the time. The bottom panel
indicates that when subjects are not sure, they tend to split their gaze more evenly between
the two colors (ie. Zt = 2) around 63% of the time.
The learning rule estimates are presented in Table 4. The left columns show how beliefs are
updated when \exploitative" choices (ie. choices made in accordance with beliefs) are taken,
and illustrate an important asymmetry in subjects' belief-updating rules. When current
beliefs indicate \green" (X
1 = 1) and green is chosen (Yt = 1), beliefs evolve asymmetrically
depending on the reward: if Rt = 2 (high reward), then beliefs update towards green with
probability 89%; however, if Rt = 1 (low reward), then belief still stay at green with prob-
ability 57%. This tendency of subjects to update up after successes, but not update down
after failures also holds after a choice of \blue" (as shown in the left-hand columns of the
bottom two panels in Table 4): there, subjects update their belief on blue up to 88% follow-
ing a success (Rt = 2), but still give the event blue a probability of 53% following a failure
(R1 = 1). This muted updating following failures is a distinctive feature of our learning rule
estimates and, as we will see below, is at odds with optimal Bayesian belief-updating.
The results in the right-most columns describe belief updating following \explorative" (con-
trarian to current beliefs) choices. For instance, considering the top two panels, when current
21We also considered a robustness check against the possibility that subjects' xations immediately before
making their choices coincide exactly with their choice. While this is not likely in our experimental setting,
because subjects were required to indicate their choice by pressing a key on the keyboard, rather than clicking
on the screen using a mouse, we nevertheless re-estimated the models but eliminating the last segment of the
reaction time in computing the Zt. The results are very similar to the reported results, both qualitatively
and quantitatively.24
Table 3: Estimates of choice and measurement probabilities
Each cell contains parameter estimates, with bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses. Each
column sums to one.
P(YtjX
t )
X
t 1(green) 2(not sure) 3(blue)
Yt = 1 0.9866 0.4421 0.0064
(green) (0.0561) (0.1274) (0.0146)
2 0.0134 0.5579 0.9936
(blue)
P(ZtjX
t )
X
t 1(green) 2(not sure) 3(blue)
Zt = 1 0.8639 0.2189 0.0599
(green) (0.0468) (0.1039) (0.0218)
2 0.0815 0.6311 0.0980
(middle) (0.0972) (0.1410) (0.0369)
3 0.0546 0.1499 0.8421
(blue) (0.0581) (0.1206) (0.0529)
beliefs are favorable to \blue" (X
t = 3), but \green" is chosen, beliefs update more towards
\green" (X
t+1 = 1) after a low rather than high reward (82% vs. 18%). However, the
standard errors (computed by bootstrap) of the estimates here are much higher than the es-
timates in the left-hand columns; this is not surprising, as the choice probability estimates in
Figure 3 show that explorative choices occur with very low probability, leading to imprecision
in the estimates of belief-updating rules following such choices.
The second columns in these panels show how beliefs evolve following (almost-) random
choices. Again considering the top two panels, we see that when current beliefs are unsure
(X
t = 2), there is stronger updating towards \green" when green choice yielded the higher
reward (66% vs. 31%). The results in the bottom two panels are very similar to those in the
top two panels, but describe how subjects update beliefs following choices of \blue" (Yt = 2).25
Table 4: Estimates of learning (belief-updating) rules
Each cell contains parameter estimates, with bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses. Each
column sums to one.
P(X
t+1jX
t ;y;r), r =1(lose), y =1(green)
X
t 1(green) 2 (not sure) 3(blue)
X
t+1 = 1 0.5724 0.3075 0.1779
(green) (0.0694) (0.0881) (0.2257)
2 0.0000a 0.3138 0.4002
(not sure) (0.0662) (0.1042) (0.2284)
3 0.4276 0.3787 0.4219
(blue) (0.0624) (0.0945) (0.2195)
P(X
t+1jX
t ;y;r), r =2(win), y =1(green)
X
t 1(green) 2 (not sure) 3(blue)
X
t+1 = 1 0.8889 0.6621 0.8242
(green) (0.0894) (0.1309) (0.2734)
2 0.0000 0.2702 0.1758
(not sure) (0.0911) (0.1297) (0.1981)
3 0.1111 0.0678 0.0000
(blue) (0.0340) (0.0485) (0.1876)
P(X
t+1jX
t ;y;r), r =1(lose), y =2(blue)
X
t 3(blue) 2 (not sure) 1(green)
X
t+1 = 3 0.5376 0.2297 0.2123
(blue) (0.0890) (0.0731) (0.1436)
2 0.0458 0.2096 0.1086
(not sure) (0.0732) (0.0958) (0.1524)
1 0.4166 0.5607 0.6792
(green) (0.0874) (0.0968) (0.1881)
P(X
t+1jX
t ;y;r), r =2(win), y =2(blue)
X
t 3(blue) 2 (not sure) 1(green)
X
t+1 = 3 0.8845 0.6163 0.6319
(blue) (0.1000) (0.1136) (0.1647)
2 0.0000 0.3558 0.3566
(not sure) (0.0968) (0.1160) (0.1637)
1 0.1155 0.0279 0.0116
(green) (0.0499) (0.0373) (0.0679)
aThis estimate, as well as the other estimates in this table which are equal to zero, resulted from applying
the constraint that probabilities must lie between 0 and 1. See the discussion in Section 3 for more details.26
4 How optimal are estimated learning rules?
In the remainder of the paper, we compare our estimated learning rules to alternative learning
rules which have been considered in the literature. We consider four alternative parametric
learning rules: (i) the optimal dynamic Bayesian model, which is the model discussed in
Section 1.1 above; (ii) a pseudo-Bayesian model, which is a version of the optimal Bayesian
model in which the decision rules are smoothed relative to the step-function decision rules in
the optimal model (cf. Figure 2); (iii) reinforcement learning (cf. Sutton & Barto (1998));
and (iv) win-stay, a simple choice heuristic whereby subjects replay successful strategies. All
of these models, except (i), contain unknown model parameters, which we estimated using
the choice data from the experiments. Complete details on these models, and the estimated
model parameters, are given in Appendix B.
The relative optimality of each learning model was assessed via simulation. For each model,
we simulated 100,000 sequences (each containing eight blocks of choices, as in the experi-
ments) of rewards and choices, and computed the distributions of payos obtained by agents.
The empirical quantiles of these distributions are presented in Table 5.
Table 5: Simulated payos from learning models
Optimal Nonparametric Pseudo- Reinforcement Win-stay
Bayesiana Bayesian Learning
5-%tile $5 $1 $2 $1 $1
25-%tile $12 $8 $9 $8 $8
50-%tile $17 $13 $14 $13 $13
75-%tile $22 $18 $19 $18 $18
95-%tile $29 $25 $26 $25 $25
aAs described in Section 1.1
Reinforcement learning, Pseudo-Bayesian, and win-stay models are described in Appendix B. For each model,
the quantiles of the simulated payo distribution (across 100,000 simulated choice/reward sequences) is
reported.
As we expect, the optimal Bayesian model generates the most revenue for subjects; the
simulated payo distribution for this model stochastically dominates the other models, and
the median payo is $17. The other models perform almost identically, with a median payo
around $3-$4 less than the Bayesian model (or about two cents per choice). This dierence27
accounts for about 25% of typical experimental earnings (not counting the xed show-up
fee).
In the next section, we look for explanations for the dierences (and similarities) in perfor-
mance among the alternative learning models by comparing the belief-updating and choice
rules across the dierent models.
4.1 Comparing choice and belief-updating rules across dierent
learning models
For the optimal Bayesian and reinforcement learning models, we can recover the \beliefs"
corresponding to the observed choices and rewards, and compare them to the beliefs from
the nonparametric learning model.22 Appendix B contains additional details on how the
beliefs were derived for the learning models.
In Table 6, we present some summary statistics for the implied beliefs from our nonparametric
learning model (denoted X
t ), vs. the Bayesian beliefs B and the valuations V  in the
Reinforcement Learning model. For simplicity, we will abuse terminology somewhat and refer
in what follows to X, V , and B as the \beliefs" implied by, respectively, our nonparametric
model, the Reinforcement Learning model, and the Bayesian model.23 This table contains
eight panels.
Panel 1 gives the total tally, across all subjects, blocks, and trials, of the number of times
the nonparametric beliefs X took each of the three values. Subjects' beliefs tended to
favor green and blue roughly equally, with \not sure" lagging far behind. The close split
22There are no beliefs in the win-stay model, which is a simple choice heuristic. The pseudo-Bayesian model
has the same beliefs as the optimal Bayesian model (with the dierence that the choice rule is smoothed).
23As we clarify in Appendix B, the nonparametric beliefs X
t were estimated from a maximum likelihood
procedure which ignores the implied correlation between choices and beliefs; this is because, given the
estimates of the choice probabilities in Table 3, which showed that P(Yt = 1jX
t = 1)  P(Yt = 2jX
t = 3) 
1, estimating beliefs X
t based on observed choices Yt would lead to estimates of beliefs which practically
coincide with choices (ie. X
t = Yt), an articially good \t" which we felt does not accurately represent the
belief process of the subjects.28
Table 6: Summary statistics for beliefs in three learning models
X: Beliefs from nonparametric model
B: Beliefs from Bayesian model
V : \Beliefs" (valuations) from reinforcement learning model Panel 1:
X 1(green) 2(not sure) 3(blue)
1878 (45%) 366 (10%) 1956 (45%)
Panel 2:
mean median std. 33%-tile 33%-tile
B (Bayesian Belief) 0.4960 0.5000 0.1433 0.4201 0.5644
V (= Vb   Vg) -0.0104 0 0.4037 -0.2095 0.1694
See Appendix B for details on computation of beliefs in these three learning models.
between \green" and \blue" beliefs is consistent with the notion that subjects have rational
expectations, with at priors on the unobserved state S1 at the beginning of each block.
The second panel shows analogous statistics for the beliefs from the Reinforcement Learning
and Bayesian models. The Reinforcement Learning valuation measure V  appears largely
symmetric and centered around zero, while the average Bayesian B lies also around 0.5.
Thus, on the whole, all three measures of beliefs appear equally distributed between \green"
and \blue".
Next, we compare the learning rules from the nonparametric, (optimal) Bayesian, and re-
inforcement learning models. In order to do this, we discretized the beliefs in each model
into three values, in proportions identical to the frequency of the diernet values of X
t as
reported in Table 6, and present the implied learning rules for each model.24 These are
shown in Table 7.
Comparing the three sets of learning rules, we see that the most striking dierence between
24Specically, we discretized the Bayesian (resp. Reinforcement Learning) beliefs so that 45% of the beliefs
fell in the B
t = 1(resp. V 
t = 1) and B
t+1 = 3(resp. V 
t = 3) categories, while 10% fell in the intermediate
B
t = 2(X
t = 2) category, the same as for the nonparametric beliefs X
t (cf. Panel 1 of Table 6). The results
are even more striking when we discretized the Bayesian and Reinforcement Learning beliefs so that 33%
fell into each of the three categories.29
Table 7: Learning (belief-updating) rules for alternative learning models
P(X
t+1jX
t ;y;r), r =1(lose), y =1(green)
Optimal Bayesian Learning Reinforcement Learning
Beliefs B
t+1, V 
t+1: 1(green) 2 (not sure) 3(blue) 1(green) 2 (not sure) 3(blue)
1 (green) 0.2878 0 0 0.6538 0 0
2 (not sure) 0.1730 0 0 0.1381 0.0115 0
3 (blue) 0.5392 1.0000 1.0000 0.2080 0.9885 1.0000
P(X
t+1jX
t ;y;r), r =2(win), y =1(green)
Optimal Bayesian Learning Reinforcement Learning
Beliefs B
t+1, V 
t+1: 1(green) 2 (not sure) 3(blue) 1(green) 2 (not sure) 3(blue)
1 (green) 1.0000 1.0000 0.6734 1.0000 0.8818 0.6652
2 (not sure) 0 0 0.1250 0 0.1182 0.1674
3 (blue) 0 0 0.2016 0 0 0.1674
P(X
t+1jX
t ;y;r), r =1(lose), y =2(blue)
Optimal Bayesian Learning Reinforcement Learning
Beliefs B
t+1, V 
t+1: 3(blue) 2 (not sure) 1(green) 3(blue) 2 (not sure) 1(green)
3 (blue) 0.3060 0 0 0.6576 0 0
2 (not sure) 0.1601 0 0 0.1261 0.0109 0
1 (green) 0.5338 1.0000 1.0000 0.2164 0.9891 1.0000
P(X
t+1jX
t ;y;r), r =2(win), y =2(blue)
Optimal Bayesian Learning Reinforcement Learning
Beliefs B
t+1, V 
t+1: 3(blue) 2 (not sure) 1(green) 3(blue) 2 (not sure) 1(green)
3 (blue) 1.0000 1.0000 0.6760 1.0000 0.8898 0.6983
2 (not sure) 0 0.0000 0.1440 0 0.1102 0.1379
1 (green) 0 0 0.1800 0 0 0.163830
them is in how beliefs update following unsuccessful choices (ie. choices which yielded a
negative reward). Comparing the Bayesian and the nonparametric learning rules (in Ta-
ble 5), we see that Bayesian beliefs exhibit less \stickiness", or serial correlation, following
unsuccessful choices. For example, consider the case of (Yt = 1;Rt = 1), so that an unsuc-
cessful choice of green occurred in the previous period. The nonparametric learning rules
(Table 5) show that the weight of beliefs remain on \green" (X
t+1 = 1) with 57% probability,
whereas the Bayesian beliefs place only 28% weight on green. A similar pattern exists after
an unsuccessful choice of blue, as shown in the left-hand column of the third panel.
On the other hand, the learning rules for the Reinforcement Learning model (also reported
in Table 7) are more similar to the nonparametric learning rule, especially following un-
successful choices. Again, looking at the top panel, we see that following an unsuccessful
choice of \green" (Yt = 1), subjects valuations are still favorable to green with probability
65%; this is comparable in magnitude to the 57% from the nonparametric learning rule.
Similarly, after an unsuccessful choice of blue (third panel), valuations in the Reinforcement
Learning model still favor blue with probability 66%, again comparable to the 54% for the
nonparametric model. It appears that the updating rules from the Reinforcement Learning
and nonparametric model share a common defect: a reluctance to \update down" following
unsuccessful choices; this common defect relative to the optimal Bayesian model may explain
the lower revenue generated by these models.
In Table 8 we compare the choice rules across the dierent models. As in the previous
table, we discretized the beliefs from each model into three values. Comparing the top
two panels, we see that, even though the belief-updating rule is the same for the Optimal
Bayesian and Pseudo-Bayesian models, the choice rules are strikingly dierent. Evaluated
at the estimated model parameter (discussed in Appendix A), choice probabilities in the
Pseudo-Bayesian model are practically invariant to the beliefs, and equal to around 50% for
all values of beliefs.
In contrast, choice rules in the Optimal Bayesian model are deterministic functions of beliefs.
Overall, the estimated choice rules in Table 3 are much closer to the Optimal Bayesian model,
than the Pseudo-Bayesian model. This suggests that the lower payos from the estimated31
Table 8: Choice rules for alternative learning models
Optimal Bayesian Learning
Beliefs B
t: 1(green) 2(not sure) 3(blue)
Yt = 1 (green) 1.0000 0.5000 0.0000
2 (blue) 0.0000 0.5000 1.0000
Pseudo-Bayesian Learning
Beliefs B
t: 1(green) 2(not sure) 3(blue)
Yt = 1 (green) 0.5141 0.4996 0.4850
2 (blue) 0.4859 0.5005 0.5150
Reinforcement Learning
Beliefs V 
t : 1(green) 2(not sure) 3(blue)
Yt = 1 (green) 0.7629 0.4939 0.2250
2 (blue) 0.2371 0.5061 0.7750
model relative to the Optimal Bayesian model arise primarily not from the choice rules
(which are very similar in the two models), but rather from the belief-updating rules (which
are quite dierent, as discussed previously).
The bottom panel of Table 8 contains the choice rules for the Reinforcement Learning model.
As shown there, the choice rules are much smoother than in the Optimal Bayesian model and
the estimated model, but not as smooth as the Pseudo-Bayesian model. This suggests that
the similarities of the payos from the estimated model relative to Reinforcement Learning
(as shown in Table 5) arise mainly from the similarities in belief-updating rules, and less
from the choice rules, which are quite dierent in the two models.
Finally, the similarity in payos between the nonparametric and win-stay models is not
surprising because, as we showed in Section 1.3 above, the reduced-form choice behavior
from the experimental data is in line with a \win-stay/lose-randomize" rule of thumb. Such
behavior is conrmed in the formal parameter estimates for the win-stay model (presented
in Appendix B.5) which show that, after receiving a positive reward, subjects tend to repeat
the previous choice with probability 87% while, after a negative reward, subjects essentially
randomize. This asymmetry in choices following good/bad rewards echoes the nonparametric
learning rules from Table 5, which showed that subjects \update down" much less following
bad rewards than they \update up" following good rewards.32
4.2 Are eye movements noisy measure of beliefs?
The empirical exercise we undertake in this paper hinges crucially on the assumption that
eye movements are constitute (noisy) measurements of the unobserved beliefs, and are not
merely noisy measurements of choices. Having used the choice data to estimate beliefs for
the nonparametric learning model, as well as the benchmark Bayesian model, we conclude
the paper by using these beliefs to perform an assessment of this critical assumption.25
Independently of our empirical model and its underlying assumptions, eye movements are
really related to some intuitive notion of how beliefs evolve? Using Bayesian beliefs as such
an intuitive (and objective) measure of beliefs, we compare each Bayesian belief B
it to the
corresponding (undiscretized) eye movement measure ~ Zit (as dened in Eq. (3)) recorded
for that subject and trial. The graphs are presented in Figure 3. In the top graph, we see
that Z is clearly increasing with B, suggesting that eye movements track well a standard
notion of beliefs.
Of course, this positive relationship could be spurious; if eye movements were not a noisy
measure of beliefs, but rather of choice, then the graph here may be picking up simply the
common dependence of both ~ Z and B on choices. To address this, we consider, in the
remaining two graphs in Figure 3, a plot of ( ~ Zt;B
t) values conditional on the choice Yt; by
conditioning on choice, we eliminate any variation in eye movements due to dierences in
choice.
For the most part, we see that the positive relationship between ~ Zt and B
t remains, even
after conditioning on choice.26 For example, the overall positive trend in the second graph
suggests, reasasuringly, that the eye tracking measure ~ Zt more strongly favored blue (ie. ~ Zt
takes large values) when there was strong evidence that blue was the good arm (ie. B
t
is large), than when there is only weaker evidence (ie. B
t is small), even after controlling
for the relationship between eye movements and choices. This is solid evidence that eye
25See also Appendix E for another approach to assessing this assumption.
26Moreover, the data will be less concentrated in the region of small values of B in the second graph
(when blue would tend not to be chosen), and large values of B in the bottom graph (where green would
tend not to be chosen). This may explain the kinks in the graphs in those regions.33
movements are related to some intuitive notion of how beliefs behave, and are not simply
noisy measures of choices.27
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we estimate learning rules nonparametrically from data drawn from exper-
iments of multi-armed bandit problems. The experimental data are augmented by mea-
surements of subjects' eye movements from an eye tracker machine, which play the role of
auxiliary measures of subjects' beliefs. Our estimated learning rules have some distinctive
features { notably that subjects tend to update asymmetrically after unsuccessful choices as
compared to successful choices. The prots from following the estimated learning and deci-
sion rules are smaller than what would be obtained from an optimal Bayesian learning model
(about $4 less for each subject, at the median), and comparable to the prots obtained from
three other parametric models: a reinforcement learning model, a \pseudo"-Bayesian model,
and a win-stay choice heuristic. Relative to the optimal Bayesian model, the belief-updating
rules from the nonparametric and Reinforcement Learning model share a common feature
that subjects appear reluctant to \update down" following unsuccessful choices; this may
explain the sub-optimality of these models (in terms of prots).
Our nonparametric estimator for subjects' choice probabilities and learning rules is easy to
implement, involving only elementary matrix operations. Furthermore, from a methodolog-
ical point of view, the modus operandi used in this paper { the nonparametric estimation
of learning models using experimental data { appears to be a portable idea which can be
potentially applied more broadly to other experiments involving dynamic decision problems.
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Supplemental appendices: not for publication
A Details of optimal Bayesian learning model
Here we provide more details about the simulation of the optimal learning and decision rules
from Section 1.1. First we introduce some notation and describe the information structure
and how Bayesian updating would proceed in the reversal learning context. Let (Yt;St;Rt)
denote the actions, state, and rewards. Furthermore, let Q denote the 22 Markov transition
matrix for the state St, corresponding to Eq. (2).
Let B
t denote the prior belief that St = 1, at the beginning of period t, while ~ B
t denotes
the posterior belief that St = 1, at the end of period t, after taking action Yt and observing
reward Rt. The relationship between B
t and ~ B
t is given by Baye's rule:
~ pt = P(St = 1jpt;Rt;Yt) =
pt  f(RtjSt = 1;Yt)
pt  f(RtjSt = 1;Yt) + (1   pt)  f(RtjSt = 2;Yt)
Combining this with Q, we obtain the period-by-period transition for the prior beliefs B
t:
2
4 B
t+1
1   B
t+1
3
5 = Q 
2
4
~ B
t
1   ~ B
t
3
5 = Q 
2
4 P(St = 1jB
t;Rt;Yt)
1   P(St = 1jB
t;Rt;Yt)
3
5 (10)
Next we describe a dynamic Bayesian learning model for the reversal-learning environment.
As in the experiments, we consider a nite (25 period) horizon, with t = 1;:::T = 25. Each
subject's objective is to choose sequence of actions to maximize expected rewards:
max
i1;i2;:::;iT
E
"
T X
t=1
Rt
#
The state variable in this model is B
t, the beliefs at the beginning of each period. Corre-
spondingly, the Bellman equation is:
Vt(B

t) = max
Yt2f1;2g

E

Rt + Vt+1(B

t+1)jYt;B

t
	
= max
Yt2f1;2g
n
E[RtjYt;B

t] + ERtjYt;B
tEB
t+1jB
t ;Yt;RtVt+1(B

t+1)
o (11)
Above, the expectation EB
t+1jB
t ;Yt;Rt is taken with respect to Eq. (10), the law of motion for
the prior beliefs, while the expectation ERtjYt;B
t is derived from the assumed distribution of39
(RtjYt;!t) via
P(RtjYt;B

t) = B

t  P(RtjYt;!t = 1) + (1   B

t)  P(RtjYt;!t = 2):
While we have not been able to derive closed-form solutions to this dynamic optimization
problem, we can compute the optimal decision rules by backward induction. Specically, in
the last period T = 25, the Bellman equation is:
VT(B

T) = max
Yt2f1;2g
E [RtjYt;B

T]: (12)
We can discretize the values of B
T into the nite discrete set B. Then for each B 2 B, we
can solve Eq. (12) to obtain the period-T value and choice functions ^ VT(B) and ^ y
T(B) =
argmaxiE[Rtji;B] for each value of B 2 B. Subsequently, proceeding backwards, we can
obtain the value and choice functions for periods t = T   1;T   2;:::;1. These choice
functions are plotted in Figure 2.
B Details on model tting and belief estimation in dif-
ferent learning models
In section 4, we compared belief dynamics in the nonparametric model (X) with counter-
parts in other two benchmark learning models, the Bayesian belief (B) and the valuation
in the reinforcement learning model (Vb   Vg). Here we provide additional details for how
the beliefs for each of the three models were computed.
B.1 Belief dynamics X in the nonparametric model
The values of X, the belief process in our nonparametric learning model, were obtained by
maximum likelihood. For each block, using the estimated choice and measurement proba-
bilities, as well as the learning rules, we chose the path of beliefs fX
t g
25
t=1 which maximized
P(fX
t gjfZt;Rtg), the conditional (\posterior") probability of the beliefs, given the observed
sequences of eye-movements and rewards. Because
P(fX

t ;ZtgjfYt;Rtg) = P(fX

t gjfZt;Rtg)  P(fZtgjfYt;Rtg);40
where the second term on the RHS of the equation above does not depend on X
t , it is
equivalent to maximize P(fX
t ;ZtgjfYt;Rtg) with respect to fX
t g. Because of the Markov
structure, the joint log-likelihood factors as:
logL(fX

t ;ZtgjfYt;Rtg) =
24 X
t=1
log

P(ZtjX

t )P(X

t+1jX

t ;Rt;Yt)

+ log(P(Z25jX

25)): (13)
We plug in our nonparametric estimates of P(ZjX) and P(X
t+1jX
t ;Rt;Yt) into the above
likelihood, and optimize it over all paths of fX
t g25
t=1 with the initial condition restriction
X
1 = 2 (beliefs indicate "not sure" at the beginning of each block). To facilitate this opti-
mization problem, we derive the optimal sequence of beliefs using a dynamic-programming
(Viterbi) algorithm; cf. Ghahramani (2001).
In the above, we treated the choice sequence fYtg as exogenous, and left the choice proba-
bilities P(YtjX
t ) out of the log-likelihood function (13) above. By doing this, we essentially
ignore the implied correlation between beliefs and choices in estimating beliefs. This was
because, given our estimates that P(Yt = 1jX
t = 1)  P(Yt = 2jX
t = 3)  1 in Table
3, maximizing with respect to these choice probabilities would leads to estimates of beliefs
fXg which closely coincide with observed choices; we wished to avoid such an articially
good \t" between the beliefs and observed choices.
For robustness, however, we also estimated the beliefs fXg including the choice probabilities
P(YtjX
t ) in the likelihood function. Not surprisingly, the correlation between choices and
beliefs Corr(Yt;X
t ) = 0:99, and in practically all periods, the estimated beliefs and observed
choices coincided (ie. X
t = Yt). However, we felt that this did not accurately reect subjects'
beliefs.
B.2 Bayesian Learning Model
The learning and decision rules for the Bayesian model were described and computed in
Section 1.1, with additional details provided in Appendix A. The sequence of Bayesian
beliefs B
t is obtained from Eq. (10) and evaluated at the observed sequence of choices and
rewards (Yt;Rt).41
B.3 Reinforcement Learning Model
We employ a variant of the TD (Temporal-Dierence)-Learning models (Sutton & Barto
(1998) , section 6) in which action values are up-dated via the Recorla-Wagner rule (R.
Rescorla & A. Wagner (1972)). The value updating rule for a one-step TD-Learning model
is given by:
V
t+1
Yt    V
t
Yt + t: (14)
where Yt denotes the choice taken in trial t,  denotes the learning rate, and t denotes the
\prediction error" t for trial t, dened as:
t = Rt   V
t
Yt; (15)
the dierence between Rt (the observed reward in trial t) and V t
Yt (the current valuation).
In trial t, only the value for the chosen alternative Yt is updated; there is no updating of the
valuation for the choice that was not taken.
P t
c, the current probability of choosing action c, is assumed to take the conventional \soft-
max" (ie. logit) form with the temperature parameter :
P
t
c = e
V t
c ==
"
X
c0
e
V t
c0=
#
(16)
We estimated the parameters  and  using maximum likelihood. For greater model ex-
ibility, we allowed the parameter  to dier following positive vs. negative rewards. The
estimates (and standard errors) are:
 = 0:2729 (0:0307)
 for positive reward (Rt = 2) = 0:7549 (0:0758)
 for negative reward (Rt = 1) = 0:3333 (0:0518):
(17)
We plug in these values into Eqs. (14), (15), and (19) to derive a sequence of valuations

V 
t  V t
b   V t
g
	
. The choice function (Eq. (16)) can be rewritten as a function of the
dierence V 
t ; i.e. the choice probability for the blue slot machine is,
P
t
b =
e(V t
b  V t
g )=
1 + e(V t
b  V t
g )= =
eV 
t =
1 + eV 
t = (18)
and P t
g = 1   P t
b. Hence, V 
t plays a role in the TD-Learning model analogous to the belief
measures X
t and B
t from, respectively, the nonparametric and Bayesian learning models.42
B.4 Pseudo Bayesian Learning Model
A Pseudo Bayesian learner uses Bayes rule to update her belief (as in the Optimal Bayesian
model), but her choices are determined (suboptimally) by the "softmax" rule, as in rein-
forcement learning:
P
t
c = e
Bt
c==
"
X
c0
e
Bt
c0=
#
(19)
The maximum-likelihood estimate of  is 0.2176 with bootstrapped standard error of 0.0138.
B.5 Win-Stay Model
The nal model is a simple behavioral heuristic. If subjects choose a slot machine and receive
the positive reward Rt = 1, they repeat the choice in the next period with probability 1   
(and switch to the other choice with probability ). If they choose a slot machine but obtain
the negative reward Rt =  1, they switch to the other slot machine in the next trial with
probability 1   .
We estimated the parameters  and  using maximum likelihood. The estimates we obtained
from the data were:
 = 0:1268 (0:0142);  = 0:4994 (0:0213): (20)
C Details on discretization of eye movements
In this section, we present additional discussion on the discretization of the eye-movement
measure, and some evidence that a three-valued discretization (which we used in our preferred
empirical specications) is sucient to capture most of the variation in this measure.
We start by assessing the discretization of Zt using a statistical approach based on the condi-
tion number of the matrix containing the sample conditional probabilities of the discretized
values of (ZtjZt 1). The intuition is straightforward: if we discretize into an excessive num-43
ber of points, the matrix containing the discretized conditional distribution of (ZtjZt 1) will
be singular, reecting the redundancy of information in the overly-discretized values of Zt.
Furthermore, and more importantly, our identication assumptions imply that the rank of
the matrix Gztjzt 1 is related to the dimension of the unobserved beliefs X; thus, a proper
discretization of Zt is required to obtain reasonable estimates of beliefs. Formally, given a
discretization of Z into K categories, the largest possible rank is
rank
 
Gztjzt 1

=
8
<
:
K if K  dim(X)
dim(X) if K > dim(X)
:
In other words,
Gztjzt 1 is
8
<
:
nonsingular if K  dim(X)
singular if K > dim(X)
:
Therefore, the dimension of X is the largest discretization K with which Gztjzt 1 is still
nonsingular.
The condition number of a matrix measures how \close to singular" a given matrix is,
with a larger condition number indicating a less well-behaved matrix.28 In this exercise, we
discretize Zt into number of points ranging from 2 to 6, and computed the condition number
for the matrix of sample conditional probabilities G(ZtjZt 1) in each case. Table 9 shows
the condition numbers for each case, along with block-bootstrap estimates of the percentiles
of their sampling distribution.
As the results show, the big jump in condition number occurs between 3 and 4; the sample
condition number jumps almost ve-fold from 10.7 to 48.1, while the estimated sampling
distribution also blows up, with the 95th percentile jumping from 15.2 to 345.9. This oers
some statistical conrmation for the three-point discretization of the eye movement measure
Zt used in our empirical analysis.
Besides this formal statistical evidence, we also present the raw histogram of the undiscretized
28Formally, the condition number of a matrix measures the sensitivity of the solution of a system of linear
equations to errors in the data, which depends on the invertibility of the matrix containing the coecients
of the linear equations. Values of condition number near 1 indicate a well-conditioned matrix, while a larger
condition numbers suggests that a matrix is close to singular.44
Table 9: Condition Number of Matrix Gztjzt 1
Dimension
K = 2 K = 3 K = 4 K = 5 K = 6
original sample 3.3586 10.6571 48.1296 292.3680 198.9212
mean 3.3627 10.7541 176.1842 981.4516 1302.2
minimum 3.2270 6.3758 14.3674 29.7191 30.9333
5th percentile 3.2270 8.2144 22.2867 66.7 62.1
25th percentile 3.2594 9.5753 33.9472 107.9 109.6
median 3.2980 10.7541 49.7292 175.1 185.4
75th percentile 3.3898 12.1294 88.8227 401.6 407.5
95th percentile 3.6331 15.1768 345.9043 1985.0 2530.2
maximum 3.6331 22.6323 39013 273180 222780
Figure 4: Histogram of undiscretized eye movement measure ~ Zt45
eye movement measure ~ Zt in Figure 4. It is apparently trimodal, with peaks at -1, 0 and 1,
suggesting that a three-value discretization of Zp indeed captures most of its variation. In
the empirical work, we use the following three-value discretization as follows:
Zt =
8
> > > <
> > > :
1 if ~ Zt <  z
2 if  z  ~ Zt  z
3 if z < ~ Zt
(21)
where z denotes a discretizing constant. As the baseline, we set z = 0:20. However,
we do not nd any dierence in the estimation results either qualitatively nor signicantly
if we vary z from 0.05 to around 0.40, suggesting that the model is robust for dierent
classications. Table 10 shows the sample frequencies of the discretized measure Zt for three
dierent values of z.
Moreover, Table 10 also shows the correlations between Y and ~ Z, broken up into the three
ranges of ~ Z corresponding to the three discretized values Z 2 f1;2;3g. Although the cor-
relation between (Y; ~ Z) in the whole sample is 0.7647, the correlations within each of the
three ranges of ~ Z drop signicantly, ranging from even negative values to values around 0.30.
Because most of the variation in choices is across the dierent discretized values of Z, rather
than within these values, it appears the three-valued discretization is sucient.
D Conditional serial correlation in eye movements
In this section we assess more formally one critical part of Assumption 3, which is that the eye
movement measures are serially independent, conditional on beliefs. That is, P(ZtjZt 1;X
t ) =
P(ZtjX
t ). Since this exclusion restriction plays a crucial role in pinning down the values of
the beliefs, we assess it by estimating an alternative model in which we do not impose this
assumption. In this alternative model, the \measurement probabilities" are given by the
conditional distribution of f(ZtjX
t ;Zt 1). In the remainder of this section, we describe how
this expanded model is estimated.
Consider the joint density f(Zt;Yt;Zt 1;Zt 2), which is solely a function of variables observed
in the data. Following the approach taken in Section 2.1 of the main text, we can factor this46
Table 10: Correlations between (Y , ~ Z) in dierent subsamples
Size Corr(Y; ~ Z)
Full sample 4200 0.7647
z = 0.20 (baseline):
Z = 1 (green) 1887 0.2845
2 (not sure) 540 0.2156
3 (blue) 1773 0.1706
z=0.05:
Z = 1 (green) 2015 0.3223
2 (not sure) 255 -0.0599
3 (blue) 1930 0.2346
z=0.40:
Z = 1 (green) 1725 0.1462
2 (not sure) 869 0.2777
3 (blue) 1606 0.0991
Note: ~ Zt refers to the undiscretized eye-movement measure, as dened in Eq. (3), and Z refers to
the discretized version, as dened in Eq. (21).47
density as follows:
f(Zt;YtjZt 1;Zt 2)
=
X
X
t
X
X
t 1
f(Zt;Yt;X

t ;X

t 1jZt 1;Zt 2)
=
X
X
t
X
X
t 1
f(ZtjYt;X

t ;X

t 1;Zt 1;Zt 2)f(YtjX

t ;X

t 1;Zt 1;Zt 2)f(X

t ;X

t 1jZt 1;Zt 2)
=
X
X
t
f(ZtjX

t ;Zt 1)f(YtjX

t )
X
X
t 1
f(X

t ;X

t 1jZt 1;Zt 2)
For a xed zt 1, we have
f(Zt;Ytjzt 1;Zt 2) =
X
X
t
f(ZtjX

t ;zt 1)f(YtjX

t )f(X

t jzt 1;Zt 2):
Technically, for any xed Yt = yt and Zt 1 = zt 1, then, we can write the above in matrix
notation as:
Ayt;Ztjzt 1;Zt 2 = BZtjX
t ;zt 1DytjX
t CX
t jzt 1;Zt 2
where A, B, C are all KK matrices, and D is a KK diagonal matrix. These are dened
Ay;Ztjzt 1;Zt 2 =

fYt;ZtjZt 1;Zt 2(yt;ijzt 1;j)

i;j
BZtjX
t ;zt 1 =

fZtjX
t ;Zt 1(ijk;zt 1)

i;k
CX
t jzt 1;Zt 2 =

fX
t jZt 1;Zt 2(kjzt 1;j)

k;j
The key eigendecomposition equation, analogous to Eq. (7) for the simpler model, becomes
Ayt;Ztjzt 1;Zt 2G
 1
Ztjzt 1;Zt 2 = BZtjX
t ;zt 1DytjX
t B
 1
ZtjX
t ;zt 1
where29
GZtjzt 1;Zt 2 =

fZtjZt 1;Zt 2(ijzt 1;k)

i;k
Therefore, we can apply this eigendecomposition to estimate f(ZtjX
t ;zt 1) for each value
of zt 1. To assess whether we need to allow for conditional serial correlation in Zt, we can
compare whether the estimated probabilities f(ZtjX
t ;zt 1) dier in zt 1, i.e.
f(ZtjX

t ;e zt 1)
? = f(ZtjX

t ;zt 1):
29Note that the invertiblity of GZtjzt 1;Zt 2 is testable for each zt 1.48
Table 11: Measurement probabilities: P(ZtjX
t )
Zt 1 = 1, (N = 1748)
X
t = 1 X
t = 2 X
t = 3
Zt = 1 0.8522 0.2138 0.0797
(0:1060) (0:1508) (0:0472)
Zt = 2 0.0923 0.4523 0.1257
(0:0649) (0:1264) (0:0508)
Zt = 3 0.0555 0.3340 0.7945
(0:0546) (0:1285) (0:0679)
Zt 1 = 2, (N = 487)
Insucient sample size.
Zt 1 = 3, (N = 1629)
X
t = 1 X
t = 2 X
t = 3
Zt = 1 0.7844 0.1706 0.0574
(0:0950) (0:1170) (0:0513)
Zt = 2 0.0732 0.5398 0.1744
(0:0553) (0:2023) (0:1160)
Zt = 3 0.1425 0.2879 0.7682
(0:0697) (0:2019) (0:1378)
note 1: cut-o for the three-value discretization is 0:2
note 2: Standard errors (in parentheses) computed across 1500 bootstrap resamples
The estimates of the probabilities f(ZtjX
t ;zt 1) for zt 1 = 1;3 are presented in Table 11.30
As the results show, the estimates of these probabilities are quite similar across dierent
values of zt 1. This suggests that conditional serial correlation in eye movements is not a
major concern, and supports Assumption 3 underlying our empirical model.
30We were not able to estimate f(ZtjX
t ;zt 1 = 2) because we observed too few observations with zt 1 = 2.49
E Belief-updating and choices following \unsure" be-
lief state
In section 4.2 of the main text, we present some evidence, based on comparing the eye
movement measures to the beliefs from the Bayesian model, that eye movements were noisy
measurements of beliefs, and not just of choices. Here, we consider another assessment of
this crucial assumption which underlies our empirical model.
Here, we exploit that fact that, in our model, beliefs (and eye movements) take more values
than choices. We consider what happens when beliefs are \unsure"; that is, when beliefs X
t
take the intermediate value of 2. Since eye movements play a crucial role in pinning down
beliefs, if eye movements are just a noisy measure of choices, then choices should be similar
following the \unsure" state (X
t = 2) than following the \sure" states (X
t = 1 or X
t = 3).
However, if eye movements contain extra information beyond that contained in the choices,
then we should nd that belief updating and choice behavior following the \unsure" state is
dierent than that following the \sure" states. The goal is to show that the \unsure" state
matters for both belief updating and decision-making.31
First we show that beliefs update dierent following the unsure state than following a sure
state. To do this, we perform a joint test that the probabilities in the left-most column
(corresponding to beliefs following belief-congruent choices) of each transition matrix in
Table 4 diers from the middle column. We construct the test statistic as follows. Let ~ L
(resp. ~ M) denote the left-hand (resp. middle) column of a matrix in Table 4, omitting the
bottom element. The test statistic is the quadratic form (~ L   ~ M)0 1(~ L   ~ M), where  is
the variance-covariance matrix of (~ L  ~ M) which was computed by bootstrap (as was all the
estimates in Table 4).
Asymptotically, under the null hypothesis of no dierences between the columns, this statistic
is distributed according to a 2-distribution, with two degrees of freedom. The corresponding
p-values are given in Table 12. The p-values are all small; the rst two p-values imply that
31We are grateful to a referee for this suggestion.50
the \not sure" and \green" belief states are distinct, while the last two indicate that the
\not sure" and \blue" states dier. Hence, the unsure state (X
t = 2) matters, in the sense
that beliefs in the following period X
t+1 are statistically dierent when X
t is a sure (\blue",
\green") state versus an unsure state.
Table 12: Tests of belief updating following unsure state
H0: P(X
t+1jX
t = 1;Yt;Rt) = P(X
t+1jX
t = 2;Yt;Rt)
(Rt;Yt): (1;1) (2;1) (1;2) (2;2)
p-value: LH=middlea 0.016 0.121 0.032 0.072
aEach entry contains the p-value under the null hypothesis that the leftmost and middle columns in the
corresponding matrix in Table 5 have the same values. Under the null hypothesis, the test statistic has an
asymptotic 2 distribution with two degrees of freedom.
However, beliefs are unobservable. How does the unsure state aect future observed choices?
To do this, we used our estimation results to compute the conditional distributions
Yt+1jX

t ;Yt;Rt =
3 X
i=1
(Yt+1jX

t+1 = i)  (X

t+1 = ijX

t ;Yt;Rt):
The conditional distribution Yt+1jX
t ;Yt;Rt describes how choices in period t are made,
conditional of beliefs, choices, and rewards in period t. This distribution is given in Table
13. As before, we want to test whether the \unsure" state (X
t = 2) has distinctive eects on
observed choices. To do this, we test, as before, whether the leftmost and middle columns of
each matrix in Table 13 are the same. The p-values under the null that these two columns are
the same are also reported in Table 13. These p-values are small, indicating scant evidence
favoring the null hypothesis; while we cannot reject the null hypothesis at conventional
signicance levels in two of the four cases (corresponding to (Yt = 1;Rt = 1) and (Yt =
2;Rt = 2)), the small p-values do favor the hypothesis that the leftmost and middle columns
are dierent. Thus, we also nd that the \unsure" state is important in predicting choices,
which implies that the eye movements Zt contain more information than is contained in
choices alone. This lends support to our modelling assumption that eye movements are
noisy measures of beliefs.51
Table 13: How current beliefs aect future choices
The conditional probabilities Yt+1jX
t ;Yt;Rt computed from estimation results.
P(Yt+1jX
t ;y;r), r =1(lose), y =1(green)
X
t 1(green) 2 (not sure) 3(blue)
Yt+1 = 1 (green) 0.5675 0.4445 0.3551
2 (blue) 0.4325 0.5555 0.6449
P(Yt+1jX
t ;y;r), r =2(win), y =1(green)
X
t 1(green) 2 (not sure) 3(blue)
Yt+1 = 1 (green) 0.8777 0.7731 0.8909
2 (blue) 0.1223 0.2270 0.1091
P(Yt+1jX
t ;y;r), r =1(lose), y =2(blue)
X
t 3(blue) 2 (not sure) 1(green)
Yt+1 = 2 (blue) 0.5653 0.3527 0.2806
1 (green) 0.4347 0.6473 0.7195
P(Yt+1jX
t ;y;r), r =2(win), y =2(blue)
X
t 3(blue) 2 (not sure) 1(green)
Yt+1 = 2 (blue) 0.8795 0.8114 0.8270
1 (green) 0.1205 0.1980 0.1731
H0: P(Yt+1jX
t = 1;Yt;Rt) = P(Yt+1jX
t = 2;Yt;Rt)
(Yt;Rt): (1;1) (1;2) (2;1) (2;2)
p-value: LH=middlea 0.109 0.091 0.022 0.163
aEach entry contains the p-value under the null hypothesis that the leftmost and middle columns in the
corresponding matrix in the above table have the same values. Under the null hypothesis, the test statistic
has an asymptotic standard normal distribution.
F Additional gures52
Figure 5: Scatter plot of Zb (xation on blue) and Zg(xation on green)
Both Zb and Zg are reported in 2  10 2 seconds.